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When a series of studies fails to replicate a well-documented effect, researchers might be tempted to use
a “vote counting” approach to decide whether the effect is reliable—that is, simply comparing the number
of successful and unsuccessful replications. Vohs’s (2015) response to the absence of money priming
effects reported by Rohrer, Pashler, and Harris (2015) provides an example of this approach. Unfortu-
nately, vote counting is a poor strategy to assess the reliability of psychological findings because it
neglects the impact of selection bias and questionable research practices. In the present comment, we
show that a range of meta-analytic tools indicate irregularities in the money priming literature discussed
by Rohrer et al. and Vohs, which all point to the conclusion that these effects are distorted by selection
bias, reporting biases, or p-hacking. This could help to explain why money-priming effects have proven
unreliable in a number of direct replication attempts in which biases have been minimized through
preregistration or transparent reporting. Our major conclusion is that the simple proportion of significant
findings is a poor guide to the reliability of research and that preregistered replications are an essential
means to assess the reliability of money-priming effects.
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Psychological science has been championing endeavors to ex-
amine the reliability of its most fundamental findings (Klein et al.,
2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015) and has been question-
ing the adequacy of mainstream research practices (Simmons,
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). The outcome of these efforts sug-
gests that some popular textbook “facts” are either unreliable or
radically inaccurate. Among the findings under dispute, priming
effects (particularly so-called social priming effects, to distinguish
them from cognitive priming effects, such as semantic or repetition
priming) have become the center of an intense, and at times
virulent, debate (Yong, 2012). Researchers working in this area
have claimed that people’s judgments, decisions, and overt behav-
ior can be dramatically swayed by exposure to subtle and seem-
ingly irrelevant cues in the environment. For example, several
studies have suggested that people are more generous after being
primed with words related to religion (e.g., Shariff & Norenzayan,
2007). In recent years, research on priming has become increas-
ingly influential, featuring in popular books (Thaler & Sunstein,
2008) and even in policy reports (Dolan, Hallsworth, Halpern,
King, & Vlaev, 2010).
However, recent studies have suggested that this widespread
enthusiasm for social priming may be unfounded. Numerous direct
replication attempts have been unable to reproduce prominent
priming effects (Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012;
Gomes & McCullough, 2015; Klein et al., 2014; Pashler, Coburn,
& Harris, 2012; Rohrer, Pashler, & Harris, 2015; Shanks et al.,
2013, 2015), and there is growing concern that some are either
substantially weaker than previously thought or are even entirely
spurious. In the Many Labs project (Klein et al., 2014), for exam-
ple, “flag priming” and “currency priming” effects could not be
reproduced in the majority of direct replication attempts conducted
by 36 independent laboratories.
Here, we focus on a particular episode of this debate that has
taken place in the pages of this journal. In a series of four
experiments (plus another two in the appendixes), Rohrer et al.
(2015) reported that they could not reproduce a prominent money
priming effect (Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, & Waytz, 2013). The ar-
chetypal observation in this literature is the apparent modification
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of participants’ behavior on a variety of measures following ex-
posure to images of money, or tasks that involve subtle activation
of the concept of money. For instance, it has been claimed that
money priming causes people to become less willing to help others
(Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006) and more likely to endorse the
values of the free market economy (Caruso et al., 2013). Despite
making extensive efforts to mimic the procedure of the original
studies and to achieve high statistical power, none of the experi-
ments conducted by Rohrer et al. yielded statistically significant
results.
In response to this series of nonreplications, Vohs (2015) de-
fended the reliability of money-priming effects by suggesting that
the discrepancy in findings must be due to a number of moderators.
For instance, participants in three of the five experiments reported
by Caruso et al. (2013) may have been more inclined to have
positive views about money because they were enrolled at the
University of Chicago, an institution with a reputation for achieve-
ments in economics. Presumably, this could induce a greater
susceptibility to money priming. Although speculative (see the
Discussion section), postulating moderators is in principle defen-
sible: If the original money-priming effects are reliable, then any
failure to observe them must be due either to insufficient power or
to some (known or unknown) moderators. This conclusion, how-
ever, is valid only if the reliability of the original findings is
beyond dispute.
Vohs’s (2015) second line of argument is focused precisely on
showing that the robustness of money priming is beyond dispute.
Following a vote counting approach (Hedges & Olkin, 1980),
Vohs provided a list of the effect sizes from 63 experimental
contrasts that appear compellingly to confirm variations of the
money-priming hypothesis. The core of this argument is that there
are too many successful demonstrations of money priming to
doubt their reliability. In her Table 1 (p. e88), she summarized
studies in which the dependent variables were performance mea-
sures such as task persistence (usually increased by subtle money
primes), and in Table 2 (pp. e89–e90) she reported interpersonal
dependent measures such as helpfulness (usually decreased). Vohs
concluded by noting the influence of money priming on a diverse
set of dependent variables:
I did not have the space to cover the entirety of money priming
experiments, which are 165 at last count. To name a few: Money
priming mitigates the fear of death . . ., potentiates the persuasiveness
of messages aimed at the self . . ., and curtails the savoring of
experiences. . . . Money cues make people averse to others’ emotional
expressiveness . . . and induce feelings of being physically colder than
otherwise. . . . In the time I spent writing this commentary, multiple
papers came across my desk relating money priming to trust, con-
nectedness to the workplace after social ostracism . . ., and disinterest
in religion. (p. e91).
Such a large body of studies seems to provide powerful
support for the reality of money priming. In the remainder of
this comment, we ask whether the large number of “successful”
demonstrations of money-priming effects confirms that these
findings are indeed robust. Alternatively, is it possible that,
despite their large number, previous reports of money priming
mainly reflect false positives? There are no easy and unambig-
uous answers to these questions. However, the meta-analytic
toolbox is well equipped to permit detection of biases that
might artificially inflate the number of positive results.
In the following sections, we explore biases in different data sets
of the money-priming literature using four meta-analytic methods.
As we show, although these methods are based on different inputs
(e.g., effect sizes, sample sizes, and p values) and make different
assumptions, they all converge on a common conclusion: The
evidence invoked by Vohs (2015) to support the robustness of
money priming is compromised by selective reporting and other
questionable research practices. In light of this evidence, we think
that there are reasons to remain skeptical about the reliability of
money priming.
Funnel Plot Asymmetry of Money-Priming
Experiments
Funnel plots provide a simple means to explore whether scien-
tific findings reflect reliable effects or, alternatively, are under-
mined by publication or more generally selection biases (Egger,
Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997) and/or by questionable re-
search practices (Simmons et al., 2011). Other things being equal,
one would expect to find more variable results among small and
underpowered studies than among large studies: Experiments with
large samples should yield very precise and reliable effect size
estimates, whereas studies with small samples should yield less-
precise and, consequently, more-variable estimates. If one plots the
effect sizes of a set of experiments against their measurement
precision, then one would expect to find a symmetric funnel-
shaped distribution, with low variability across very precise studies
and increasing variability as precision decreases. However, there is
no a priori reason why the average effect size should vary across
studies as a function of precision.
In contrast, if a set of studies is strongly biased by the decision
to select only significant results, then their effect sizes will nec-
essarily be related to measurement precision (Nosek, Spies, &
Motyl, 2012; Rosenthal, 1979). The reason for this is that only
very large effects can reach statistical significance in small (im-
precise) studies, whereas even very small effects can be detected in
large (precise) studies. Consequently, selection bias will induce a
correlation between effect sizes and precision, so that smaller
studies yield larger effects than do larger studies (Button et al.,
2013). Although this correlation is typically considered an index of
publication bias, it is an equally valid means to explore whether the
experiments selected for inclusion in a narrative review, such as
the one presented by Vohs (2015), which includes both published
and unpublished research, represent a biased sample of the evi-
dence.
In Figure 1 we plot the effect sizes of four data sets against the
standard errors of the treatment effects (precision). The gray con-
tour denotes the area in which effect sizes are nonsignificant in a
two-tailed t test (  .05). The first set of effect sizes, represented
by the darker circles (blue in the online version of the article),
refers to the results of the seminal article on money priming (Vohs
et al., 2006) and the original results of the study (Caruso et al.,
2013) that Rohrer et al. (2015) attempted to replicate. As noted by
Rohrer et al., visual inspection suggests that the effect sizes in this
data set are strongly correlated with their standard errors. Egger’s
regression test for funnel plot asymmetry (Egger et al., 1997)
confirms that this relation is statistically significant, t(12)  5.42,
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p .001. The second set of effect sizes, denoted by squares (green
online), comprises the effect sizes of the experiments reported by
Rohrer et al., including not only the four experiments reported in
their main text but also two additional experiments included in the
appendixes. This set of effect sizes also includes 36 data points
from the Many Labs project (Klein et al., 2014), which also
attempted to replicate the results of Caruso et al. (2013). As can be
seen, in this data set there is no evidence of asymmetry, t(40) 
1.48, p  .15, suggesting that these nonreplications are minimally
affected by selection and reporting biases.
The two remaining data sets in Figure 1 refer to the effect sizes
included in Vohs’s (2015) Tables 1 and 2.1 On the basis of the
information available in those tables and in the articles where these
effect sizes were originally reported, we coded all effect sizes as
positive when they went in the direction predicted by the authors
and as negative when they departed from the predictions. Several
of the effect sizes included in Tables 1 and 2 were not statistically
independent (i.e., they referred to different dependent variables
collected on the same participants). To avoid giving undue weight
to nonindependent effect sizes, we included in our analyses only
the first effect size from each study. However, to confirm that this
decision did not make an important difference to our conclusions,
the excluded effect sizes are shown in Figure 1 as lighter circles
(orange in the online article). Regression tests confirmed that the
remaining effect sizes were also related to their standard errors,
both for the studies included in Table 1 (triangles, which are red in
the online article), t(18)  3.87, p  .001, and those included in
Table 2 (diamonds, which are purple in the online article), t(21) 
1.89, p  .072.2
Beyond the quantitative results of Egger’s regressions, perhaps
the most remarkable feature of Figure 1 is that many of the effect
sizes that reached statistical significance are packed together im-
mediately adjacent to the gray contour representing statistical
significance. Funnel plot asymmetry is not a perfect indicator of
selection and reporting biases (Ioannidis, 2005; Sterne et al.,
2011), but the close alignment of effect sizes with the border of
significance makes it difficult to believe that this distribution of
effect sizes is unbiased. This is perhaps more clearly illustrated in
Figure 2, which represents the density function of z scores within
these data sets. We computed z scores by dividing each effect size
by its standard error and fitted the density functions using a
Gaussian kernel. As can be seen, the modal z scores in the studies
included in Vohs’s (2015) Tables 1 and 2 are just large enough to
be statistically significant in a two-tailed test. This is also the case
for the small set of data points that we excluded from statistical
analyses (because they were not independent from the others) and
for the experiments reported by Vohs et al. (2006) and Caruso et
al. (2013).
Overall, the patterns of data depicted in Figures 1 and 2 suggest
that the effect sizes obtained experimentally by Vohs et al. (2006)
and Caruso et al. (2013) and those listed by Vohs (2015) are likely
to be biased either by the decision to select only significant results
(Nosek et al., 2012; Rosenthal, 1979) and/or by questionable
research practices such as selective reporting of significant out-
comes, p-hacking (John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Simmons
et al., 2011), and hypothesizing after the results are known
(HARKing; Kerr, 1998).
Selection Models
Asymmetric funnel plots can arise for reasons other than selec-
tion and reporting biases (Ioannidis, 2005; Sterne et al., 2011). For
instance, if researchers allocate more participants to experiments
exploring small effects, then effect sizes and standard errors will
be correlated even in the absence of selection bias (a compelling
example can be found in the supplemental information of the Open
Science Collaboration, 2015). In light of this shortcoming, it is
always important to explore biases using alternative techniques
that rely on different assumptions. Selection models provide an-
other useful means to explore biases (Hedges, 1992; Sutton, Song,
1 Some of the studies included in Vohs’s (2015) tables were unpublished
manuscripts or conference presentations. Although we were able to access
most of them, we could not gain access to some reports. In one case
(Mukherjee, Manjaly, Kumar, & Shah, 2015), we were unable to contact
the authors of the study. In three cases (Park, Gasiorowska, & Vohs, 2015;
Sarial-Abi, Hamilton, & Vohs, 2015; Sarial-Abi & Vohs, 2015), we were
able to contact the first authors, but they preferred not to share their
manuscripts or disclose more details of the statistical analyses. Although
irrelevant for our present analyses, the authors alerted us that two of these
papers (Sarial-Abi et al., 2015; Sarial-Abi & Vohs, 2015) actually refer to
different experiments of a single manuscript in preparation. During the
review of the present article, an anonymous reviewer revealed that the data
reported by Chatterjee, Rose, and Sinha (2013) are under investigation
because several lines of evidence suggest that they are tainted (Pashler,
Rohrer, Abramson, Wolfson, & Harris, 2016). Consequently, in our anal-
ysis we omitted two data points from this article that were originally
included in Vohs’s tables. Before conducting our analyses, we recomputed
the effect sizes with the information provided in the original reports. In
most cases, our estimations coincided exactly with the ones reported by
Vohs or were reasonably close. However, in two cases, we observed
important divergences, and consequently, we replaced the effect sizes
reported by Vohs by our own estimations. A table with all the effect sizes
included in the subsequent analyses is available at https://osf.io/9n2wh/.
2 Tests for publication bias tend to suffer from low statistical power.
Therefore, it is common to adopt an alpha of .10 in these tests (Egger,
Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997; Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007; Sterne,
Gavaghan, & Egger, 2000). In the present article we present exact p values
for all our tests of publication and reporting biases.
Figure 1. Contour-enhanced funnel plot of four data sets. The light gray
area represents studies with p values larger than .10. The dark gray area
represents marginally significant p values (i.e., .05  p  .10). Lines
represent Egger’s regression test for funnel plot asymmetry. See the online
article for the color version of this figure.
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Gilbody, & Abrams, 2000). These models assume that the distri-
bution of observed effect sizes depends not only on the average
effect size of an area of research and its heterogeneity (as the
random effects models used in meta-analyses typically do) but also
on a weight function that determines how likely it is that a
particular effect size will be selected for publication (or, in the
present case, for discussion in a review), given its p value. Dif-
ferent selection models make different assumptions about the
shape and properties of this weight function (Hedges & Vevea,
2005; Sutton et al., 2000), but in all cases, it is assumed that the
best fitting parameters of the weight function can be used to
estimate the potential impact of selection bias.
In Figure 3 we show the best fitting weight functions of two
selection models (Dear & Begg, 1992; Rufibach, 2011) applied
to the same four data sets that are included in Figure 1. These
models were fitted using the maximum likelihood estimation
procedure implemented in the selectMeta R package (Rufibach,
2011). The weight profiles provide an estimation of the likeli-
hood that a result will be selected given the level of statistical
significance it achieves. In the absence of selection bias, these
profiles would be flat and the area below the weight function
should be evenly distributed across all p values. In contrast, if
the data are substantially affected by selection bias, small p
values should be weighted more and, consequently, most of the
area below the weight function should concentrate around small
p values. As can be seen, both models suggest that p values play
a crucial role in the distribution of effect sizes reported in Vohs
et al. (2006) and Caruso et al. (2013), and in Tables 1 and 2
from Vohs (2015), but much less so in the Rohrer et al. (2015)
and Klein et al. (2014) data. The best models of the former data
sets are ones in which studies yielding p values greater than .1
are virtually guaranteed to be excluded. When the available data
are so biased, it becomes difficult to estimate the true effect
size.
It is important to note that the weight functions shown in
Figure 3 do not simply reflect the fact that nonsignificant p
values are abundant in Rohrer et al. (2015) and Klein et al.
(2014) but rare in the Vohs (2015) data sets. Selection models
do not yield a weight function with a sharp decline merely
because there are many significant findings. When studies are
high powered, selection models can fit the distribution of ob-
served results without assuming an irregular weight function,
even if most of them are statistically significant. Instead, se-
lection models yield nonflat weight functions when the propor-
tion of nonsignificant results is implausibly low given the
observed distribution of effect sizes and sample sizes. Thus, the
weight functions depicted in Figure 3 show that a distribution of
results like the one presented by Vohs is unlikely to have arisen
in the absence of selection bias.
Test for Excess Significance
As an additional means to explore potential biases, we tested
whether this set of studies contains an excess of significant find-
ings. Psychological experiments are rarely adequately powered,
where power is defined as the probability that the null hypothesis
is rejected under a true experimental hypothesis. Average sample
sizes are usually too small to warrant the conventionally prescribed
level (.80) of statistical power (Button et al., 2013; Sedlmeier &
Gigerenzer, 1989). This stands in stark contrast with the large
proportion of published studies reporting significant results (see
Fanelli, 2012). The discrepancy between studies’ average power
and the observed number of significant results can be used as a
proxy to estimate selection or reporting biases (Ioannidis & Trika-
linos, 2007; Schimmack, 2012).
The first row in our Table 1 shows the proportion of significant
results reported in the four sets of studies. The proportion of
statistically significant findings in Vohs et al. (2006) and Caruso et
Figure 2. Kernel density plots of z scores in five data sets. The vertical dashed lines represent z scores of 1.64
and 1.96, respectively. All z scores to the right of the right line are statistically significant in a two-tailed test.
The z scores between the lines are marginally significant in a two-tailed test. See the online article for the color
version of this figure.
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al. (2013) is .86. However, the average observed power of the
experiments reported in those articles is .68. Indeed, their average
power to detect an effect of the size estimated with a random-
effects or a fixed-effect meta-analysis is only .55. The proportion
of significant results (.86) is thus larger than either of the power
estimates. Even if the null hypothesis is false, it should not be
rejected as frequently as it is in these studies, reflecting an “ex-
cess” of significant results above what would be expected, given
the studies’ average power, and suggesting that the results of the
experiments reported in those articles are “too good to be true”
(Francis, 2012). The last two rows in Table 1 suggest that a similar
trend is observed for the studies included in Vohs’s (2015) Tables
1 and 2 (see footnote 2), except for power estimates based on
fixed-effect and random-effects effect size estimates in Table 2
(which are inflated by the inclusion of at least one clear outlier; see
Figure 1).
p-Curve Analysis
Recently, Simonsohn, Nelson, and Simmons (2014) have devel-
oped p-curve, a new tool to assess the evidential value of a series
of statistical contrasts that is based on the distribution of p values.
Unlike the tools used in the previous analyses, p-curve focuses
only on statistically significant results and makes no assumptions
about the distribution of nonsignificant results. If a series of
significant statistical contrasts is exploring true effects, then very
small p values (e.g., p  .025) should be more prevalent than are
larger p values (e.g., .025  p  .05). In contrast, if the real effect
is zero and all significant results are false positives, then all p
values are equally likely. The specific shape of the distribution of
p values depends on the average statistical power of the contrasts
included in the analyses: High-powered contrasts give rise to very
steep right-skewed p-curves where most p values are very un-
likely; underpowered experiments, on the contrary, give rise to
flatter p-curves.
In employing p-curve, the statistical contrasts to be included in
the analysis are not always the simple effects that researchers
typically use to compute effect sizes. Therefore, conducting a
direct p-curve analysis of the effect sizes listed in Tables 1 and 2
of Vohs (2015) would violate the core assumptions of p-curve. We
therefore analyzed the original reports to extract the appropriate
statistical contrasts. As explained in footnote 1, we were unable to
access some of the unpublished studies included in Vohs’s Tables
1 and 2. Consequently, these could not be included in the analysis.
Given that p-curve ignores nonsignificant results and that we were
unable to access some unpublished experiments, we conducted a
single analysis on all the available contrasts, without subdividing
them into the categories used in Figures 1–3. Some of the exper-
iments included in the p-curve analysis contained several statistical
contrasts that were equally valid for our present purposes. When
this was the case, we used the first contrast in the main analysis. To
make sure that this decision did not influence the results, we
conducted a robustness test in which these contrasts were replaced
by the second valid contrast reported in those experiments. A
p-curve disclosure table explaining how we selected each statisti-
cal contrast is available at https://osf.io/928r3/.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of significant p values within
this data set. As can be seen, both the main analysis and the
robustness test suggest that the p-curve is rather flat, with only
very small p values (p  .01) being slightly more prevalent. A
continuous test using the Stouffer method suggests that the p-curve
is significantly right-skewed for both the main analysis and the
robustness test (z  4.06, p  .0001, and z  5.16, p  .0001,
respectively). However, closer inspection of these results reveals
that they are mainly determined by three contrasts (five in the
robustness test) with very low p values. Given that p-curve is
strongly biased by extreme p values (Simonsohn, Simmons, &
Nelson, 2015), it is worth complementing these analyses with a
simple nonparametric binomial test comparing the proportion of p
Figure 3. Best fitting weight functions of two selection models (Dear &
Begg, 1992; Rufibach, 2011) applied to the four data sets shown in Figure
1. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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values lower than .025 with the proportion of values between .025
and .050. This test yielded nonsignificant results for both the main
analysis (p  .266) and the robustness test (p  .168).
Does this mean that these studies lack any “evidential value”?
Not necessarily. Within null hypothesis significance testing, a null
result is never evidence for the absence of an effect. As a practical
means to test whether a set of studies lacks evidential value,
Simonsohn et al. (2014) suggested testing whether the p-curve is
even flatter than one would expect if studies were powered at .33
(i.e., if it is flatter than a very flat p-curve). A binomial test
contrasting the observed distribution of p values against a null of
.33 power was statistically significant (p  .032) for the main test
and marginally significant (p  .076) for the robustness test,
confirming this extreme flatness. In fact, the estimated average
power of these studies, after correcting for selection bias, is only
.18 for the main analysis and .25 for the robustness test. These
power values, derived from the shapes of the observed p-curves,
stand in stark contrast with the average observed powers that we
computed in Table 1 without correcting for publication bias. This
discrepancy is consistent with the hypothesis that the effect sizes
of these studies are strongly biased.
Overall, these analyses yield mixed results. On the one hand, the
significant results of the continuous test suggest that the studies
included in this data set might be exploring real effects. However,
this conclusion is heavily influenced by a small number of data
points and is not supported by nonparametric binomial tests. Fur-
thermore, the rather flat distribution of p values suggests that the
evidential value is modest.3
Discussion
It can be difficult to conceive that a scientific finding reported in
dozens or even hundreds of experiments might not be reliable.
Given just a few nonreplications and a long list of apparently
successful studies such as the ones documented by Vohs (2015) in
her Tables 1 and 2, it is tempting to conclude that money priming
is a robust effect and that any failure to observe it must be due to
a Type II error or to the presence of unknown moderators. How-
ever, meta-analysts have long known that this “vote counting”
method is a poor approach for assessing the reliability of an effect
(Hedges & Olkin, 1980). Simply contrasting the number of studies
yielding significant versus nonsignificant results neglects the rich
information conveyed by the distribution of effect sizes. For in-
stance, a set of experiments can be dominated by null results even
if a true effect does exist (Vadillo, Konstantinidis, & Shanks,
2016), and conversely, publication and reporting biases can give
rise to a large number of significant findings in an area of research
where real effects are very small or even completely absent
(Shanks et al., 2015).
The analyses reported in the present article suggest that money-
priming studies are likely to be influenced by selection bias,
reporting biases, or p-hacking. Although the four methods we used
(funnel plot asymmetry, selection modeling, testing for excess
significance, and p-curve analysis) are based on different assump-
tions, they all converge in finding irregularity in the data. Meta-
regression methods ignore p values and evaluate the relationship
between sample size and effect size in order to draw inferences
about funnel plot asymmetry. Selection models use the effect sizes
3 It is perhaps worth noting that statistical inference from p-curve can
sometimes be unclear and misleading. The p-curve can be right-skewed
even when the data are strongly biased by questionable research practices
(Bishop & Thompson, 2015; Lakens, 2015). Furthermore the term eviden-
tial value, typically employed when a p-curve is significantly right-skewed,
is ambiguous at best when used outside a purely Bayesian framework (E.-J.
Wagenmakers, personal communication, January 21, 2016).
Table 1
Test of Excess Significance
Set of studies
Proportion of
significant results
Mean observed
power
Mean power to detect
RE estimate
Mean power to detect
FE estimate
Vohs et al. (2006); Caruso et al. (2013) .86 .68, p  .122 .55, p  .017 .55, p  .017
Klein et al. (2014); Rohrer et al. (2015) .02 .14, p  .998 .05, p  .884 .05, p  .884
Table 1 in Vohs (2015) .85 .70, p  .103 .67, p  .060† .65, p  .043
Table 2 in Vohs (2015) .79 .65, p  .096† .84, p  .820 .77, p  .526
Note. Proportion of significant results in each data set and three measures of average power: (a) mean power to detect the effect size reported in each
individual study, (b) mean power to detect an effect of the meta-analytic size estimated with a random-effects (RE) model, and (c) mean power to detect
an effect of the meta-analytic size estimated with a fixed-effect (FE) model. The p values refer to the significance of one-tailed binomial tests contrasting
the probability of the observed proportion of significant results given the three estimates of average power.
† p  .10.  p  .05.
Figure 4. The p-curve of the key statistical contrasts for the studies
included in Figure 1 whose main text was accessible. The p-curve disclo-
sure table is available at https://osf.io/928r3/. See the online article for the
color version of this figure.
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and their standard errors to draw inferences about the likelihood
that studies yielding particular p values are selected. The test for
excess significance uses sample size and effect size to determine
whether the proportion of significant effects is greater than would
be expected, given the experiments’ power. And p-curve ignores
sample size and effect size to draw inferences about evidential
value. In each case, evidence relevant to the existence of bias is the
end result. These methods rest on different assumptions, and hence
the conclusion cannot be attributed to any one particular, possibly
disputable, set of assumptions. In the context of such reporting and
selection biases, the sheer number of experiments yielding signif-
icant results and their average effect sizes provide little informa-
tion about the reliability of a field of research.
It is doubtful whether known or unknown moderators should be
invoked to explain the discrepancy in the results. If our confidence
in money-priming effects were absolute, then any failure to ob-
serve it should necessarily mean that the replication was not
properly conducted or that something important was different in
the replication. However, as our confidence in the original finding
decreases, the need to invoke moderators also declines. Further-
more, the potential moderators proposed by Vohs (2015) have not
been reconciled with other evidence presented in favor of the
money-priming hypothesis, nor has their influence been verified in
any empirical enquiry. For instance, the assumption that money-
priming effects might be strong only among students from insti-
tutions with a reputation in economics, such as the University of
Chicago, might explain why the effect was absent in the partici-
pants tested by Rohrer et al. (2015). However, Vohs’s Tables 1 and
2 reveal that money-priming effects were seemingly found in very
diverse populations, including not only university students from a
wide range of institutions but also young children (Gasiorowska,
Zaleskiewicz, & Wygrab, 2012). Speculation about potential mod-
erators may be valuable as a means of hypothesis generation, but
it is not an appropriate means of hypothesis confirmation (Kerr,
1998; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit,
2012). If these extensions to the money-priming hypothesis are to
have theoretical value, then they should (a) explain why other
priming studies conducted in “a diverse range of locations . . .
college students, working adults, children as young as 4 years old,
and business managers” (Vohs, 2015, p. e87) were apparently not
influenced by the proposed moderator and (b) generate new pre-
dictions that can be verified empirically (Lakatos, 1978; Meehl,
1990).
Of course, our analyses were not based on a systematic search
of all the money-priming experiments, both published and unpub-
lished, that have been conducted. Rather, we focused on the target
studies conducted by Vohs et al. (2006) and Caruso et al. (2013)
and in particular on those listed by Vohs (2015). An important goal
for future research is to undertake a comprehensive formal meta-
analysis, according to best practice guidelines (Lakens, Hilgard, &
Staaks, in press; Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, Altman, & the PRISMA
Group, 2009), including a clear description of the inclusion criteria
and search procedure, as well as appropriate measures to explore
biases and correct them. It is of course possible that such a
comprehensive meta-analysis will yield conclusions different from
those obtained here. For instance, an in-depth literature search
might yield many unpublished studies (which typically observe
smaller effect sizes than do published research; see Franco, Mal-
hotra, & Simonovits, 2014; Polanin, Tanner-Smith, & Hennessy,
in press) and/or additional published high-powered studies with
large effect sizes. In either case, the consequence would be to
attenuate or indeed even eliminate the funnel plot asymmetry
shown in Figure 1. Whether such a meta-analysis would lead to a
final comprehensive data set both lacking asymmetry and yielding
a positive meta-analytic effect size is perhaps unlikely, but it
would certainly extend the evidence base. Similarly, it would also
be informative to confirm (or challenge) the results of our analyses
with alternative tools for the exploration of selection and reporting
biases (e.g., Copas, 1999; Guan & Vandekerckhove, 2016; van
Assen, van Aert, & Wicherts, 2015).
In any case, our major conclusion is that the simple proportion
or number of significant findings is a poor guide to the reliability
of research. Nothing precludes the urgent need for more direct,
preregistered replications of money-priming effects (van Elk,
Matzke et al., 2015; Wagenmakers et al., 2012). Any narrative
review of money priming that ignores the distortion induced by
selection bias and questionable research practices is unlikely to
paint a true picture of the evidence.
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